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APPROXIMATION AND SUPPOSITION
Abstract. This article compares exponents of approximation (expressions
like Russian     , 	
   , 	
  

     ,     , ﬀﬁﬃﬂ ) and the
words expressing supposition (for example Russian     ﬀ!"   , #$ﬀ	    ,
ﬀ
 

 %

  ). These words are often confused in research, in particular re-
searchers often mention exponents of supposition in case of exponents of
approximation. Such approach arouses some objections.
The author intends to demonstrate in this article a notional difference bet-
ween approximation and supposition, therefore the difference between expo-
nents of these two notions. This difference could be described by specifying
different attitude of approximation and supposition to the notion of knowl-
edge. Supposition implies speaker’s ignorance of the exact number, while
approximation does not mean such ignorance. The article offers examples
proving this point of view.
Keywords: approximation, supposition, Russian.
Approximation as a notional category with a wide range of different ways of
expression in natural languages has been described in many publications, such as:
Wierzbicka (1991) (for Polish and English languages), &(')*'+ (1962) (for Rus-
sian), ,.-/102'3 (1985) (for Russian), Grochowski (1997) (for Polish) and Duškin
(2009) (for Polish and Russian). Despite such an impressive amount of researches
attempting to describe approximation as a notional category, another important
question remains open that requires additional consideration.
One of the most complicated and still unsolved tasks while describing the cate-
gory of approximation is its separation from the category of supposition. Exponents
of these two categories are often mixed up in research of different authors.
For example, in one work by Suprun written in 1962 among examples of ap-
proximation exponents expressing an approximate number “without a nuance of
limit”, there could be found both expressions 45768:9;57<1= , 45761>?@6BA61CD9E?@F<1= , G , =$H=?@=
and following modal words: I	=?1JK<1=L>$MNCOF , 8=	JP9CQ>$MNCOF , 41=	JPR!?@ST , HR$JP9CDGU 1
( &(')*'+ 1962, p. 10).
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The reason why supposition exponents are found among the exponents of ap-
proximation could be the fact that the difference between these two notions is
not clearly determined. Notional difference between the two sentences: VW5761X?@=
45768:9;57<1= 20 Y9E?@=Z9H and VW5761X?@=.<@RZ9;57<1=9 20 Y9E?@=Z9H is intuitively percepti-
ble, yet the essence of this difference seems not to be so evident. This difference
needs to be precisely defined and described. We shall try to accomplish this task in
this article.
The article is based on Russian language material, yet it stays of general the-
oretical character so far as the research exposed in it has been carried out “from
content to form”. The presented method of separation of the two notions - those of
supposition and approximation — could be applied not only to Russian, but also
to other languages, considering the fact that it describes and defines first of all two
contents, possible to be expressed in every language in certain way.
The mechanism of approximation needs such definition which would take into
account its explicit notional distinctions from the mechanism of supposition, other-
wise the sphere of approximation would have rather fuzzy bounds, and intuitively
grounded absence in it of such expressions as <@RZ9;57<1=9 , Z=!A!8=	JK<1= could look
disputable.
The main difference between approximation and supposition could be found in
the character of their relation to the notion of knowledge.2 All exponents of suppo-
sition imply, that speaker does not know, whether the state of affairs mentioned in
the sentence is taking place. They signalize other mental states of speaker than
knowledge (Koseska-Toszewa, Maldžieva, Penčev 1996, p. 63), (Maldžieva 2003,
p. 11, 15–22, 54 etc.). This feature could be considered as one of constitutive traits
of supposition exponents as a class.
For example, saying:
VO9CD9[Z=!A!8=	JK<1= / <@RZ9;57<1=9 / 45\9!I	41=?@=	JK61CD9?@F<1= / GH=]5\9!9^ZG!9!_= 20 ?79C .
speaker informs, that he does not know how old Peter is (is he indeed 20 or not),
as well as in each case of separate presumptive expression, he announces some other
additional information.
Connection of approximation with the notion of knowledge is completely differ-
ent.
Approximation could be defined in the following way:
Instead of one point speaker refers to a segment of arithmetic range (set of
points). One of the points of this segment corresponds to the determinable number,
but speaker does not inform which point it is (for example, >9AL8:R!?@=_= 50 ‘... 47
or 48 or 49’) 3. Approximation exponents select segments in different ways, and the
components of segment selection are basic components of their meaning.
2 It is worth to notice that knowledge is most likely a semantically elementary no-
tion; many researchers use the expression to know that ( #!  , `   , Pol. wiedzieć,
że), connected to it, as the central element of explications of other mental predicates
(Danielewiczowa 2002, p. 75–76).
3 The segment could be selected in the following ways:
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Approximation described in this way can not be identified with lack of knowl-
edge of the exact number. Approximation can certainly result from such lack of
knowledge, but not always. The fact that speaker does not inform of the point in
arithmetic range (informs of a segment), does not mean, that he does not know
this point. (Although on the other hand, he may be ignorant about it).
First let us illustrate the situation when speaker uses approximate numerical
definition, knowing the exact one (knowing the point.)
Let us imagine the following situation. John reads a paper at conference on US
economics. In this paper he quotes the exact amount of penalties, paid by Microsoft
Company in 2009 (this amount is written in the text read by John). In the written
text, for example, it is 3.034.500.025 I	=?B?7R57=Z 34 a@9<1CDR . This definition is very
long (verbose), complicated to be pronounced by the speaker and apprehended by
the audience ( C576b86?B?@6@R5\I$RcC576@I	a@RCOFdY9COM@5\9e86?B?@61=$<@Rf4U@COFG=$CgCOMhGU@Y
I$ZRI	a@RCOFi4U@COFPI	=?B?7R57=ZjC576@I	a@RCOFPY9COM@5\9ka@9<1CDR ). Instead of reading the
exact definition as a whole, John gives an approximate definition of this amount,
informing the audience briefly: =$H=?@=DC5\9lm86?B?@6@R5\I	=Z[I	=?B?7R57=Z . In other words,
in this example John knows the amount, sees its exact definition and even can
read it to the audience, but he gives an approximate definition because of its being
form is three times shorter than the exact one.
It is possible to quote the following examples, which demonstrate that approx-
imation (information about a segment) is not necessarily consequence of speaker’s
ignorance about the point:
n
9oD9!GCDZ=f9;5\9!ZCO=pZM@5\R>RCOMhZR9CDGUb6BApH=]57Mq>9;5\9AMsr:9!_=mH=$<1a@9<1C5\Ra16UjZ
4@RGCD9^G=GCDRZ!?BU79Ct_I$9uvCO=c=$H=?@=wI$9!GU@CO6d457=$a@9<1CO=Z ( 9!G?@6x>$MNCOFfCO=$YB<1My8
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As follows from these examples, sometimes speaker can specify the approximate
number, quoting the exact one (in case he knows this exact number).
On the other hand, there are situations when speaker is able to define the
number only approximately, and can not define it exactly, due to the fact he really
does not know the point.
Finally, it should be noticed that approximations are possible not only concern-
ing exact numbers, but also concerning approximate numbers. In later case speaker
– by setting the lower boundary of the segment exclusively (e.g. Rus. ﬀﬁﬃﬂ ) or inclu-
sively (e.g. Rus. B]  ﬂ )
– by setting the upper boundary of the segment exclusively (e.g. Rus. !EwW#   "   ,
]B ) or inclusively (e.g. Rus. B   ﬂ )
– by setting both boundaries of the segment (e.g. 20-30 )
– by setting the centre of the segment (e.g. Rus.     ).
For a broader account on approximation and ways of its expression in Russian see
Duškin (2009).
124 M. Duškin
presents a segment containing the point, which corresponds to the number to de-
fine, but he only acts supposively. He does not know whether this point is really in
the given segment or not.
Compare:
VW57=$X?@= , <@RZ9;57<1=9 , =$H=?@=mYRG!R [...] [ ±²*f³'  \´ﬃ*  )1/@2-!c  µ +1¶
·

@¸
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lºZMhZ=I	M»AZSYRC¡41=]5\R	A61CD9?@F<1= : 9!G?@6fG!9T1YRG<@R[A98<1=8¼XDR5\9O<@RGYB61COMNu
ZR9CDGUp>$=?79!9 180 _=GSI$R5\GCDZ , CO=[HwH=$<1a1S XXI Z9HR^6Bld>$SI$9C , Z=!A!8=	JK<1= ,
=$H=?@= 900 . [ ­(/@  1s*»,./121+1h½+1'-!*-!/1d&(-!¬!'*1(~  /10¾-.-!31  
¿
	ÀÀÀ¶E¸Á;
[...] <@RS$?@61a@R	lmÂ.=GHZMº45\9!I	41=?@=	JK61CD9?@F<1==$H=?@= 50 COMhG . I$9CD9T , ZLÃNR<1HC -
VO9CD9;57>$S5\_9 — =$H=?@= 16 COMhG . [ Ä+O+1 (2002) // « ½Ns-!*1!+Å - ­(/@0 »,
2002.02.26]
In other words, supposition and approximation are not the same. Suppositions
concerning approximate number are possible.
Concluding, the difference between the exponents of approximation and those
of supposition can be described in the following way. Speaking about the number
to be defined while using exponents of supposition (
¹
lk>$My?@=^<@RZ9;57<1=9 5 ) speaker
informs, that he does not know the exact definition of this number (a point in arith-
metic range). In case when the number is defined by exponents of approximation,
this information is not communicated (compare
¹
l»>$My?@=¢=$H=?@= 5 86??@61=$<1=Z ( R
CO=$YB<@9!9 5200350)). Using an approximate definition, speaker can both know and
not know the exact number. In most cases exponents of approximation carry no
information about knowledge/ignorance of speaker concerning the exact definition
of the number.
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